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Abstract
Despite their limited lifespan and reduced cost, nano-satellite missions have proved to be suitable platforms for
Earth observation, scientific experiments and technology demonstration. During the last years, the number of nano-
satellite missions has noticeably increased, posing the need to improve several system characteristics to ultimately
endorse the full potential of this class of spacecraft. In this context, this paper presents three design guidelines that
can be applied in nano-satellite software in order to improve the system robustness, modularity and autonomy. The
design guidelines presented in this paper, namely, hierarchy-enabled robustness, payload-oriented modularity, and
on-board planning capabilities, are complemented with a structured review of complementary software techniques
and architectural concepts that have been found in the literature. The paper justifies that these system-wide qualities
are some of the most critical when designing flight software for CubeSat-like spacecraft and explores how they can
improve mission performances and operability, enhance the system’s tolerance to failures and ease the development
cycles. Finally, this paper illustrates the application of the design guidelines by detailing the on-board software
architecture for the 3Cat-1, a CubeSat program carried out at the Nano-Satellite and Payload Laboratory of the
Technical University of Catalonia (UPC BarcelonaTech).
1. Introduction
Nano-satellites have become an affordable alternative for many companies, research organizations and
universities to access the space market, both as consumers and providers. Usually deployed in Low-Earth
Orbits, nano-satellites have proven to be suitable platforms for technology demonstration [1], a variety
of Earth observation and remote sensing purposes, science and research (e.g. [2]) and many other space5
applications such as low-power communications or maritime activity surveillance (e.g. [3]).
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Either adopting the CubeSat design philosophy and standardized structure, as in the 3U-based FLOCK
constellation by Planet Labs [4], or designing spacecraft busses that take up less than 60 cm per side1 like
NASA’s CYGNSS constellation [5], nano-satellite platforms have already been adopted by agencies, small
and large corporations and have have been developed under many educational programs since the appearance10
of the CubeSat standard. While the latter types of missions tend to be fully designed, implemented and
operated by heterogeneous teams at universities and are generally less demanding in terms of accuracy and
reliability, the vast presence of university-developed nano-satellite missions is a clear sign of the ongoing
democratization of space and the constant exploration of small spacecraft’s science return capabilities. On
the other hand the interest and adoption of these types of platforms by the industry (e.g. [6, 7]) evidences15
a clear paradigm shift and suggests a complexity increase for future mission architectures based on nano-
satellite technologies.
Albeit this situation has led to the development of multiple successful, monolithic nano-satellite missions,
lately, the adoption of this class of spacecraft has also been considered especially favorable for the develop-
ment of new mission architectures such as fractionated spacecraft, satellite constellations and swarms [8].20
The combination of several instruments hosted at different nano-satellites has been envisaged as an enabler
for new Earth observation missions with enhanced performance and improved system qualities [9].
In this scenario, some companies have already been offering software components, hardware modules and
complete subsystems that are compliant with the de facto standard (i.e. CubeSat Units), ranging from com-
plex Attitude Determination and Control Subsystems (ADCS), to Electrical Power Supplies (EPS), robust25
communication protocols, low-power on-board computers or Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS). These
and many other CubeSat-compliant commercial components, facilitate the development and integration of
spacecraft and remove the burden of designing and testing some critical subsystems and modules. Thus,
apart from coping with the complex task of integration, most nano-satellite developers ultimately focus
on the development of mission-specific payloads and, most importantly, the design and implementation of30
custom flight software that controls the spacecraft at device- and system-level.
Given that software is usually understood as the final architectural element to achieve the desired func-
tionality, less attention has been placed on software-related issues during the emergence and consolidation of
the CubeSat era. However, software and its architectural characteristics can be critical for the management
of the mission; their correctness severely affects the functionality of the spacecraft. As a matter of fact,35
designing proper software architectures is also essential to achieve system-wide qualities such as reliability
and performance, and should not be understood as the mere fact of writing functionally correct programs.
In this context, this paper poses the need for improvement and explores the qualities and characteristics
1NASA’s CYGNSS spacecraft measures 18 x 42 x 60 cm when stowed, although this volume mostly accounts for the GNSS-R
antenna and solar panels.
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Figure 1: Visual summary of common desired functionalities, qualities and characteristics of nano-satellites, critical architectural
requirements for their on-board software, and how they map to three design guidelines.
of nano-satellite systems. By identifying critical functionality and architectural requirements, this paper
motivates the application of a design methodology for new designs that is composed of three essential40
guidelines, namely:
1. Payload-oriented modularity : emphasizes the importance of proper encapsulation and generalization
of low-level components in order to adapt software architectures to the needs of multi-payload missions
and fast development cycles.
2. Robustness through hierarchical decomposition: aims at structurally reducing error propagation and45
intends to minimize the complexity of critical system control parts by decoupling them from hardware
and low-level modules.
3. On-board planning capabilities: provides a set of minimum components that can enhance the autonomy
of a spacecraft by virtue of automatic generation of mission plans and robust execution of tasks.
This set of design guidelines, summarized in Figure 1, are presented as generic overarching character-50
istics rather than implementation features. Thus, they can be applied vertically throughout a whole flight
software framework. Furthermore, due to the fact that specific industry standards are not considered in this
3
study, these design guidelines can be embraced both by educationally-based programs and by industries de-
veloping their spacecraft, contributing, thus, to the foundations of future-generation nano-satellite software
architectures.55
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 identify the critical qualities and features that modern
nano-satellite software should improve. Section 3 explores techniques to do so by revisiting and structuring
knowledge hitherto presented in literature. Section 4 derives the set of generic design guidelines which can be
adopted at architectural levels and which improve the selected system qualities. Finally, Section 5 illustrates
the application of these design criteria with an instance of those guidelines in the flight software architecture60
of the 3Cat-1 nano-satellite mission.
2. Identifying the architectural requirements for next-generation software architectures
Determining the essential requirements for nano-satellite flight software requires the assessment of both
their functional traits, the particularities of this type of systems, and the desired all-encompassing qualities.
The impact of these three aspects upon the design process is probably common to that of many engineering65
fields, and their interaction needs be taken into consideration just as much as they need be individually
considered. Functional requirements essentially describe the behavior of the system (internal and external)
and can easily draw specific structural design requirements: functions can easily be decomposed into blocks
and their interrelationships. On the other hand, the specific system characteristics, or its context, will also
reveal indirect design requirements that should be well studied at design time. Not only these relate to the70
limiting conditions under which the system operates (e.g. intermittent or continuous operation, influenced
by external factors that may cause failures, setting a maximum number of concurrent operations) but they
also encompass particular details of the development process, such as: whether they need to be produced in
mass, or not; the types of devices on top of which the software will run; how much of the design will need
to be changed and which parts will suffer greater modifications; etc. The number of possible functions and75
specific system characteristics can be vast and is out of the scope of this study. Instead, the present analysis
is interested in common aspects that do apply in most nano-satellite missions and which can translate to
generic design requirements.
Indeed, this set of generic requirements is very much motivated by functional characteristics, system
limitations and external conditions. However, these factors also enforce high-level attributes of a software80
architecture, which can also be grouped and studied under the term of quality attributes. Accordingly,
a software architecture should not only define the system in terms of tangible actions, relationships or
functionalities but it should also play a significant role in achieving these system-wide quality attributes.
Designing a suitable architecture will allow or preclude just about all of a system’s characteristics, thereby
leading the goodness of a software architecture to strongly affect the integrity of the whole system.85
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The IEEE Standard for a Software Quality Metrics Methodology [10] defines software quality as the
degree to which the software possesses a desired combination of attributes. These non-functional attributes
of a software system (e.g. reliability, performance, usability) can map to specific, yet high-level, requirements
and may often be intertwined with each other.
The set of quality attributes one can use to assess a particular software architecture differs depending90
upon the source. So much so that lexically similar or identical qualities can have different names and the same
quality can be found with slightly different definitions. The considered attributes and their definitions in
this paper are taken from the standards in [11–14] and references [15, 16]. Note, however, that because they
relate to qualitative aspects, assessing them quantitatively is often a very subjective exercise that has not
tackled neither in the cited works nor in this analysis. In order to minimize semantic ambiguities and provide95
a more generic set of requirements, this paper proposes three groups of quality attributes that encompass
many of the specific ones discussed in the references. The requirements proposed in this paper, justified in
detail in the following sections, are: (a) robustness, (b) modularity and scalability and (c) autonomy. These
quality attributes will ultimately be mapped into three independent design rules later in this paper.
Aside from possible inter-dependencies, software quality attributes may be conceptually bound to the100
desired functionality and external limitations of a system. In other words, some system limitations and
functional requirements will force some of this qualities to become actual requirements. As an illustration of
the latter statement, consider a case in which a software needs to process large volumes of data (function)
but is forced to run in a computationally-limited hardware (system characteristic). While, in this case, the
software architecture would require a certain performance, if the software would run on several different105
platforms, one would say that the software needs to have high portability. This conceptual binding between
functionalities, system characteristics and the high-level qualities of a software, are graphically represented
in Figure 1, for the groups of attributes proposed above.
2.1. Robustness
Space applications are subject to countless sources of failures. While the effects of ionized particles in110
the on-board semiconductors, such as Single Event Upsets (SEU) and Single Event Latchups (SEL) are
one of the most common sources of errors, other situations like one-time subsystem malfunctions, power or
communication failures can cause a variety of run-time errors. In order to protect their microcontrollers
and memories against SEU’s and SEL’s, large spacecraft are often equipped with radiation-hardened devices
that can withstand greater doses of ionizing radiation. Contrarily, nano-satellite designs hardly include such115
devices, usually owing to the spacecraft limited power and mass budgets and sometimes due to the habitual
use of regular COTS components.
Similarly, large satellites also combine the use of rad-hard technology with sophisticated real-time oper-
ating systems, hypervisors and middleware which present reliability guarantees and provide the foundations
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for robust software environments. The latter types of products, however, are not restricted in nano-satellite120
developments. A good example of these can be found in NASA/GSFC’s Core Flight Executive and Core
Flight Software2 (cFE and cFS), an open-source middleware which is available for some open-source kernels3
(e.g. RTEMS, Linux) and which can be used to develop flight applications. The cFS/cFE middleware is a
comprehensive flight software framework that extends the Operating System and provides common services
and a myriad of re-usable modules. Adopting these may ameliorate the robustness of the system since this125
products have been exhaustively tested and verified [17]. Regardless of this suite already being tested in
NASA’s nano-satellite missions [18], its adoption is still not broad enough and many current developments
are still implemented on top of simpler, commonly known operating systems (e.g. FreeRTOS or standard
Linux kernels), which lack most of the reliability guarantees of additional, space-qualified middleware.
In these situations, the mission software should be able to withstand the system’s failures and correct130
them. From an architectural standpoint, not considering qualities like recoverability or reliability during
the software design process poses a risk to the mission and could become one of the causes of a global
breakdown. While the reliability of an architecture is related to the ability to perform the required functions
without failures or within a bonded failure rate, recoverability emphasizes how good the recovery strategies
are. In order to recover from a fault or unexpected state, one may argue that the architecture needs to be135
designed with robust system state control and some kind of error detection mechanism. Because of that, this
evaluation framework considers critical to implement the available architectural methods and alternatives
to achieve robust software, also in nano-satellite programs.
2.2. Software modularity and scalability
During the last years, developing, launching and operating high-density constellations of nano-satellites140
started to become a reality. Ventures like the one started by Planet Labs have planned to operate constella-
tions of up to 200 homogeneous units [4] in order to offer Earth imagery at medium-resolutions (3-5 m) with
daily revisit times. The capabilities of satellite constellations consisting of many nano-satellite units are
promising and suggest the need for modular architectures, also from a software viewpoint. As a matter of
fact, next generation constellations should not necessarily involve identical units orbiting at different orbits145
but could also encompass a set of heterogeneous nano-satellites orbiting closer and communicating with one
another. In that scenario, software architectures not only need be replicable but shall be variable enough to
attain the control of a diversity of payloads.
Simultaneously, many nano-satellite programs tend to continue their activities after a successful mission
and develop new generations of spacecraft based on their previous designs. In this context, designing reusable150
2https://cfs.gsfc.nasa.gov
3Please note that at the time of writing this paper, FreeRTOS support for cFS/cFE was already in development but had
not been officially released as part of NASA’s Operating System Abstraction Layer (OSAL).
6
systems does have a significant importance in order to reduce, even more, the development times of future
nano-satellite units.
As technology advances, new, smaller, less power-consuming and more capable devices and modules will
surface. Nano-satellites will, then, increase their payload capacities and will likely require flight software
capable of controlling and interfacing more subsystems. The need for scalable and flexible software archi-155
tectures were modules can be added, changed or removed without affecting the core of the architecture
therefore becomes evident. In this respect, several attributes can be studied to asses how complex it is
to modify an architecture to some extent. Terms such as variability, extensibility and subsetability reflect
the ease with which a software architecture can be modified to produce new designs that differ in specific,
preplanned ways and assess the required actions to do so. Similarly, maintainability or modifiability also160
express the ease with which a software system or component can be modified to correct faults, improve
some characteristic or adapt to a changed environment. When the changes are exogenous to the software
architecture itself, one can study the portability of the design by assessing how complex it is to migrate it
from one platform4 to a different one. With more or less emphasis in each of them, this set of qualities are
deemed essential in this study and will be considered when deriving specific design guidelines in the sections165
that follow.
2.3. Spacecraft autonomy
There are many different factors which suggest that nano-satellites be provided with a certain degree of
autonomy. To begin with, observability in satellites can be extremely constrained. Depending on the orbit
altitude and inclination and the location of the ground stations, satellites in Low Earth Orbits (i.e. most170
nano-satellites) can establish communication links in the order of up to 4-5 times per day, with durations
in the range of 5 to 10 minutes, approximately. Assuming good elevation conditions for the ground station
antennae, nano-satellite operators might be able to communicate with their spacecraft during 30-45 minutes
every 24 hours if occasional link deterioration caused by environmental factors is not considered. Conse-
quently, the amount of information that can be downloaded from a LEO satellite is extremely restricted, let175
alone the limited data rates often found in nano-satellite systems.
These communication restrictions may preclude mission operators from reacting to unexpected failures
with agility and could lead the satellite to remain in safe modes for long periods after an error is detected.
Intermittent communications thus worsen the spacecraft performance if science opportunities are missed
during the latter situation. Conversely, autonomous spacecraft that can replan their activities not only will180
improve the spacecraft’s data acquisition capabilities but will also ameliorate the mission’s robustness.
On the other hand, limited telemetry bandwidth could prevent the retrieval of fine-grained states of the
satellite. When satellite actions and resource allocations are planned in the ground segment, not knowing the
4Here the term “platform” can refer to either the underlying hardware modules, or the CPU architecture, or the OS.
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state of the spacecraft with enough accuracy can negatively affect the way they are computed. Combining
spacecraft state uncertainties with the uncertainties inherently found in space environments may, in addition,185
turn the plan generation into a very complex endeavor.
Furthermore, autonomous spacecraft can also deliver higher quality data if they are provided with al-
gorithms that intelligently optimize the data collection and download. This capability is not new for large
spacecraft and has been demonstrated in the past for several satellite missions. An example of this is
NASA’s Earth Observing One (EO-1), a spacecraft which performed on-board data analysis and replanning190
to optimize the volume of data downloaded to ground [19]. The three-tiered software architecture in EO-1
encompassed a scheduler module (CASPER) that was able to replan activities, including downlink, based on
science observations in the previous orbit cycles. Although computing resource allocation and performing
data analysis on-board demands higher computational capabilities, the same on-board planning software
was successfully integrated in the IPEX nano-satellite mission in 2013 [20], demonstrating that this class of195
satellites can also support and benefit from the sophisticated algorithms present in autonomy systems.
Notwithstanding the fact that the commented autonomous capabilities are common in large satellite
missions, many nano-satellite operation approaches are still relying upon the interaction of spacecraft with
ground segment controllers. When nano-satellites pass over their ground stations, they receive sequences
of time-tagged telemetry commands whose execution is statically scheduled at ground. Modern approaches200
are those implementing goal-based operations, where ground operators only modify the mission goals and
allow the spacecraft to autonomously schedule its activities to meet the current goals [21, 22]. Mission goals
inherently encapsulate complex and flexible command sequences that will be decomposed on-board, and are
not accompanied by a fixed execution time. This type of approaches, in which nano-satellites would be more
autonomous, improve the mission performance by allowing the spacecraft to optimize the timeline of actions205
not only based on the state of resources and subsystem but also with a given degree of awareness of captured
data quality. Nano-satellites with instruments that can only operate under certain conditions (e.g. optical
imagers are generally constrained by lighting and cloud-coverage conditions) could autonomously decide
when to enable their instruments based on predictions (e.g. lighting conditions) and on-board analysis of
data (e.g. cloud coverage), thus saving power and storage efficiently.210
Having explored the system characteristics, qualities and common functional aspects, this paper proposes
this framework of three essential requirements (robustness, modularity and scalability, and autonomy) to be
applied during the design process of future nano-satellite software. The items presented in the framework
have essentially arisen from the technological context and current trends in the small spacecraft community:215
while CubeSat-based systems have proven to be a time- and cost-effective alternative to develop high-
performance, complex space systems, the number of nano-satellite programs is growing incessantly. All the
aforementioned architectural requirements are achievable through software engineering efforts and encompass
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many of the quality attributes found in architecture evaluation methods.
Whereas there are many systems described in the literature which improve most of the critical qualities220
(reliability, flexibility, autonomy, performance, etc.) their descriptions and designs have been presented
and addressed from their particular mission standpoints, preventing their architectures, components and
techniques to be generally applied in different contexts. It is the purpose of this paper to explore some of
these techniques and designs and to derive a set of design guidelines that satisfy the requirements presented
in this section and which can be generally applied in new software architectures for nano-satellites.225
3. Review of Current Solutions
This section gathers a compendium of architectural concepts and design techniques that are present or
have been applied in successful programs. While some of the items of this list are basic concepts with which
most software engineers will be familiar, all of them can be concurrently embraced at the design phase as a
means to improve some of the essential quality attributes for nano-satellite flight software.230
3.1. Process isolation and protected shared resources
Time and Space Partitioning (TSP) are well-known techniques in the aviation and space industries to
deliver robust software. TSP kernels and middleware allow one computer to be used for many different ap-
plications and the controlled use of the system’s shared resources (i.e. memory, I/O devices...) Applications
executed using a TSP approach have their memory regions protected from the rest of the processes and are235
executed within deterministic time slots managed by a global hypervisor running on top of the OS. While
Inter-Partition Communication is reliably managed and guaranteed by intermediate layers, this approach
allows high-level applications to be executed seamlessly without affecting other computer components upon
their failure.
Applying time and space protection for the applications running in spacecraft is a common and rec-240
ommended approach that can be found in many spacecraft designs [23]. Nonetheless, it may require the
utilization of specific RTOSes or middleware. The idea of process isolation, however, is also implemented in
widely known kernels like Linux. These operating systems are, on the contrary, much more available and
known than specific TSP products and they naturally provide process isolation (i.e. a virtual address space
for each process). The use of Linux in small satellite developments is not new (e.g. [20, 24–28]) and also245
owes to the inherent use of readily available COTS components (i.e. on-board computers). In Linux-based
designs, however, the mechanisms to control the access to shared resources (e.g. storage devices, commu-
nication ports, etc.) should be carried out separately, since most Linux drivers are not designed to provide
such feature.
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Figure 2: PolySat’s Second Generation Bus software architecture (extracted from [29] and adapted)
3.2. Real-Time Operating Systems250
The utilization of real-time software in the nano-satellite community is highly accepted and recom-
mended. Programming flight software applications in real-time environments is essential to guarantee the
execution of critical processes. While priority-based real-time systems implement reliable scheduling algo-
rithms that prevent task priority inversions, inter-task communication and synchronization services provided
by real-time kernels also allow the deployment of complex architectures.255
Most modern RTOSes support many of the processor architectures found in spacecraft computers (e.g.
PowerPC, ARM, SPARC...) The availability of hard-real-time OSes ranges from industry renowned products
like RTEMS5, VxWorks6, QNX7, LynxOS8 and so on, to small-footprint, free and/or open-source alternatives
such as FreeRTOS9 or µC/OS-III10. On the other hand, in the list of real-time alternatives one can also
include Linux patches, such as PREEMPT RT11 or Xenomai12. These options, which provide soft-real-260
time capabilities to standard Linux kernels (e.g. priority-based preemptive scheduling), can also be suitable
for nano-satellite developments although their timing capabilities (i.e. latencies) are not comparable to
specialized hard-real-time products.
3.3. De-embeddable core and safe devices
Architectural approaches to improve software robustness can be found in multiple nano-satellite designs.265
An easily applicable example can be found in the flight software developed at California Polytechnic State
5https://www.rtems.org
6https://www.windriver.com/products/vxworks
7http://www.qnx.com
8http://www.lynx.com/products/real-time-operating-systems/lynxos-rtos
9http://www.freertos.org
10https://www.micrium.com/rtos
11https://rt.wiki.kernel.org
12https://xenomai.org
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University, for their series of CPx nano-satellites. Figure 2 shows the two-tiered PolySat’s software archi-
tecture, consisting of the Processes and Libraries layers, deployed on top of a Linux kernel. The processes
layer encompasses the so-called static processes (i.e. processes which are always active) and the temporary
processes (i.e. are launched on-demand). Depending on their functionality and criticality, static processes270
are sub-categorized into system or mission processes, clearly identifying the main platform modules. In
addition, the libraries layer, which provide services and hardware interfaces to the processes layer, is also
logically divided into a set of basic libraries (“PolySat Library Base”) plus an extension set (“PolySat Library
Full”).
Their reusable software architecture has been the main controlling software on-board CPx spacecraft and275
is characterized by presenting two modes of operation, namely, degraded- and full-mode. In degraded-mode,
the on-board computer only runs critical processes which do not access devices that are sensitive to radiation
damage (i.e. NAND storage device). These critical processes implement the minimal functionality for the
satellite to be operable and are responsible to switch to full-mode once the contents of the NAND device
have passed an integrity test.280
Designing software architectures with de-embeddable cores that require a minimum set of hardware
components to run, may allow ground operators to keep control of the spacecraft even when parts of the
system are unusable. In the lack of redundant systems, this kind of techniques can enhance the overall
robustness of the system and ameliorate the lifespan of the spacecraft.
3.4. FDIR methodology285
Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery techniques are quite spread among space applications and have
recently landed in the nano-satellite community. FDIR systems externally monitor system variables and
infer the occurrence of errors by checking their expected values, usually against a predefined model. In the
event of failures, FDIR systems detect their severity and apply some actions to isolate, circumvent and solve
the errors, whenever possible. Implementing safe modes where the spacecraft can safely remain upon the290
occurrence of errors is a common technique that allows ground operators to return the system to a desired
state and may prevent loss of contact.
Despite the high computational load required to run complex FDIR systems, there have been nano-
satellite missions that considered them to some extent. On one hand, Technical University of Delft has
applied FDIR analysis on their DelFFi program [30] by studying how to detect and isolate failures in295
several subsystems and devices (e.g. deployables, UART, I2C, memories). Their analysis resulted in a set
of procedures and rules to trigger state transitions to safe modes and/or to signal the errors.
Among the active small satellite initiatives, ESA’s 3U CubeSat OPS-SAT encompasses a dedicated FDIR
computer which monitors each payload board through a modular controller [25]. Apart from the ability to
monitor houskeeping data coming from the OBC and reacting to a small set of telemetry commands, the300
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FDIR computer is able to circumvent Single Event effects (i.e. SEU, SEL) by electrically isolating the
payload boards from the system bus.
3.5. Dynamically-linked libraries
Segmented software implementations which consist of a set of programs, libraries and drivers can be
partially updated by only replacing some of their fractions. While shared libraries offer the possibility to305
encapsulate reusable code outside the kernel that can be loaded or called by several programs, the fact that
they are easily replaceable significantly increases the update-ability and modularity of the system as well.
Furthermore, since nano-satellite communication channels impose severe constraints on the volume of data
that can be transferred, maximizing the software modularity should be deemed essential when designing in-
orbit firmware update methods. A common update methodology is the application of patches to the software310
binaries. Usually, patches consist of new program data appended to the existing binary and accessed through
jump instructions injected in specific program locations. Although this method can reduce the uploaded
volume of data, its complexity is critical and may imply longer development and test times. Systems based
on dynamically-linked modules could ease this procedure by allowing the replacement of the whole module
(both in-orbit or during integration stages).315
PolySat’s design philosophy actually followed this approach, resulting in all the basic software features
being implemented in shared libraries. Linux-based operating systems include the Dynamic Linker, a com-
ponent that loads and links shared libraries needed by the executables at run-time. Although updating a
software architecture in-orbit could be accomplished by securely replacing programs and library binaries
through telemetry commands, the most valuable advantage is the ability to upgrade a component without320
recompiling nor modifying the rest of the architecture (e.g. kernel, drivers, other components. . . )
3.6. Centralized vs. distributed approaches
Regardless of the system topology being an extrinsic characteristic to software engineers, the choice
of one or another notably affects the design of the software architecture. The majority of nano-satellites
are centered around a single on-board computer that controls each subsystem though low-level, interface325
microcontrollers. Even though this system architectures inflict a risk on the mission if the OBC presents a
failure, the complexity of the system is reduced given that most computations are performed on the same
device. Communicating software components within the same environment is easy and achieved through
kernel services (e.g. pipes, message queues, shared memory heaps. . . ) Nonetheless, distributed approaches
have also flown in previous missions, such as the one presented by the AAUSAT3 (Aalborg University,330
Denmark).
AAUSAT3’s software architecture [3] is based on a set of applications that run on top of the platform’s
software stack: the bootloader, the kernel and a collection of libraries (Figure 3). Although the system
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Figure 3: AAUSAT3’s software platform
architecture of the AAUSAT3 did not allow to migrate all the applications to different nodes (i.e. some of
them rely on hardware components which are only accessible at their node), missing one module does not335
necessarily imply a global mission breakdown. While isolation of components running in different nodes and
application concurrency is achieved naturally and effortlessly, distributed approaches remove single-points-
of-failure (SPoF) thanks to the replication of baseline components (on-board computer, OS. . . )
3.7. Software redundancy
Hardware redundancy is usually prohibitive in nano-satellites due to its cost and complexity. However,340
implementing redundancy at the software level is achievable and can solve some of the effects caused by
SEU. Two possible types of software redundancy are envisaged and are listed as follows:
a) Data redundancy: the authors of [31] state that critical data may be redundantly stored within a memory
device to be able to recover from SEU effects. They applied this technique for the KySat-1 flight software,
an educational CubeSat project by the Kentucky Space Consortium. The KySat-1 stored three copies345
of sensitive data on the on-board EEPROM to ensure its integrity in the event of a bit-flip caused by
radiation particles. Although this technique might not be applicable for large volumes of data, it could
be a suitable solution to protect critical, non-volatile system parameters or temporary scientific data.
b) Bootloader redundancy: storing the boot images in Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) memories pre-
vents the on-board computer from starting with a corrupted image and has been implemented in some350
programs (e.g [28]). Despite TMR being a hardware technique, the concept of triplicating and voting
a system image can also be performed in software within a single memory chip. Albeit less robust, the
improvement can be adopted with little extra cost, mainly in terms of complexity, in many nano-satellite
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programs. The AAUSAT3 can easily illustrate the idea. Engineers of the AAUSAT3 program designed
a CAN-based bootloader that can start any given application on the spacecraft boards [3]. This boot-355
strap system, which was designed in conjunction with the so-called Software Image Server (SWIS), was
intended to perform firmware updates securely (i.e. if an application fails, the system can return to the
previous version or switch to a different one). Notwithstanding, the SWIS is essentially a system that
can store redundant copies of a boot image and reliably select and correct corrupted ones. Similarly,
on-board computers with sufficient capacity in their ROM devices could implement simpler concepts to360
protect the most critical data: the kernel image.
3.8. Other techniques towards robust software
The literature covers plenty of software techniques to achieve robust software which are suitable in
nano-satellite developments. Although describing them all is not the object of this paper, this section con-
cludes with three valuable design concepts that may mitigate or help to detect problems in small spacecraft365
platforms.
1. Robust communications: exchanging information between two entities is often critical. Processes
and modules may communicate to send system commands and their responses, system variables or
sensitive data (e.g. subsystem configuration parameters). In some cases, this information exchange
may be performed over unreliable communication channels or may be affected by SEU effects. In order370
to prevent unreliable delivery of digital data, the communication protocols should implement Error
Detection and Correction techniques (EDAC). While the list of available EDAC techniques that can
be implemented in software is extensive and can be complex (e.g. [32]) there are simple techniques
that can be generally adopted with ease:
(a) Data integrity checks: checksums or cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) ensure that the transferred375
information has not suffered any modification.
(b) Acknowledgments: both positive and negative ACK segments are sent to signal the correct re-
ception of a packet.
(c) Handshakes: communication is only started after ensuring that both ends are prepared.
(d) Timeouts: control the time between queries and replies to avoid hanging on deadlocked processes.380
2. Hardware and software watchdogs: watchdogs are timers that cause automatic resets if the system
under control is not responding [33]. Hardware watchdogs are present in many devices (i.e. microcon-
trollers) and their use may prevent global failures since they can restart the device when it is locked
in unexpected deadlocks or failures. At the same time, software-based watchdogs can also be imple-
mented. Process heartbeats can be utilized to detect deadlocks and to reset the processes whenever385
they occur.
14
b1 b2
c1 c3c2 c4 c6c5
b3
a1
Totally detatched
from hw.
Utterly hw. 
dependent
b4
functionalities 
are much more 
intertwined
Start high-level tasks, set mission 
constraints, trigger system states, 
validate sensor data with models.
Manage active processes/threads, 
expand states, decrypt telemetry 
commands, manage subsystems.
Send commands to devices, 
enable power regulators, log 
scientific data.
Abstraction
f1 (e.g. energy management)
f2 (e.g. attitude control)
f3 (e.g. communications)
f4 (e.g. payload management)
f5 (e.g. data processing and storage)F u
n c
t i o
n a
l i t
y
Prevent error 
propagation
Illustrative goals
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3. Robust programming: establishing strict coding rules and standards is critical for the management of a
project with many collaborators. Stating rules that forbid certain programming constructs in order to
ensure security and reliability can be key in applications where failure rate must be kept to the mini-
mum. While the adoption of industrial standards is always the preferred alternative, their complexity390
and lack of knowledge can be an obstacle to many educational nano-satellite programs. Nonetheless,
simpler alternatives like the ones suggested by NASA/JPL Laboratory for Reliable Software in [34]
can be applied with less effort and are highly recommended.
4. Structured design criteria for nano-satellite flight software
Considering the presented compendium of techniques and concepts as a fundamental staring point,395
this section now poses three structured design rules that can be applied vertically throughout nano-satellite
software architectures. These criteria involve both structural and functional artifacts that are complementary
to the summarized techniques and which are specifically oriented to improve, even further, the groups of
requirements presented in Section 2.
While most of the practices gathered in the previous section could improve the system’s modularity400
and cope with the inherent presence of failures, they also show that these questions can be solved under
many perspectives and at many levels: from low-level procedures or implementation recommendations to
structural approaches and system design methodologies. Likewise, this section tries to contribute to the
list of software design practices by proposing a set of guidelines that mimic some generic design rules while
considering the specific needs and functional commonalities of nano-satellite flight software (i.e. mainly for405
Earth observation and technology demonstration missions).
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4.1. Robustness through hierarchy
The architectures introduced above exhibited efforts towards the system robustness; most of them were
focused on accurately detecting and minimizing the effects of errors. However, none of the practices boosted
the robustness from a purely architectural perspective. Instead, they provided measures to counteract410
the problems: disable modules, trigger contingency modes, etc. Despite these measures being absolutely
necessary, robustness can also be enriched in an abstract and generic manner through the ordering of
software components. In this regard, the first proposed guideline is based on two fundamental concepts:
encapsulation and goal-oriented decomposition of functionalities.
Component encapsulation is, actually, the basis of any design and its correctness not only will affect415
the performance of the system but can also worsen some other qualities (e.g. testability, modularity).
While most nano-satellite architectures simply juxtapose modules encapsulated by the functionality of the
spacecraft’s subsystems, this approach complicates component interactions and lacks system perspective.
Conversely, software modules can be organized to keep hierarchical relationships. Just like organizations
are divided into strata with different responsibility levels, a software architecture can also be split into several420
levels of abstraction (i.e. layers) in order to model the system. Each of these levels of abstraction requires the
interaction with the adjacent ones to be able to develop a global function, hence establishing a hierarchical
relationship. The first benefit of such modeling approach is the ability to remove error propagation paths.
Layered structures where modules maintain hierarchical relationships may cut the propagation of errors if
modules in each layer are sufficiently isolated. Figure 4 illustrates this idea by representing an arbitrary425
architecture divided into three levels of abstraction. The lines that connect each box represent module
inter-dependency (i.e. “use cases”) and reflect the hierarchical relationship explained above. If the modules
were implemented as sand-boxed processes, these relations would be communication channels through which
one process can invoke routines on another. Robust inter-process communication could allow processes in
layer B to be isolated from errors in processes of layer C (e.g. a segmentation fault on module c1 would430
not affect module b1). Therefore, it becomes critical that modules which maintain some kind of dependence
with others be provided with deterministic response to errors when external invocations fail unexpectedly.
In addition to that, this very vertical encapsulation of components, or “layering”, can be naturally
combined with the commonly implemented horizontal fragmentation based on functionality. This introduces
the latter concept: goal-oriented decomposition of functionalities. While modeling the software into different435
levels of abstraction allows to cut error propagation paths easily, disseminating functionalities (fi) among
the layers also minimizes the complexity of each component. In accordance to this idea, a given functionality
would be split into multiple tangible actions, or “goals”, more or less abstract. Figure 4 illustrates possible
goals with different abstraction degrees. At the same time, the figure shows that high-level components are
functionally complex and may encompass several functionalities as the abstraction increases.440
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With this decomposition approach, components that rely on hardware (i.e. modules that control sub-
systems or interface with payloads) can be completely isolated from system-wide controllers that operate at
a much higher abstraction level and that are critical to the mission management. Since high-level modules
are untied to subsystem failures and implement abstract functions (e.g. Finite State Machines), they be-
come easier to implement and simpler to verify by static source code analyzers. The hardware detachment445
presented by higher modules may enable them not only to be designed simpler but to be implemented in
protected hard-real-time environments13, inherently improving their robustness by allowing a deterministic
scheduling policy of those components.
4.2. Payload-oriented modularity
The ability of a software architecture to be extended and modified relies on its modularization. Generally,450
identifying the subsets which maximize internal coupling and minimize coupling between modules is a
demanding intellectual exercise and is influenced by subjectivity. Nonetheless, a certain lack of generality is
usually needed in all engineering areas in order to deliver products that are tailored to the actual requirements
and context. In this respect, software architects can follow the steps in [35] which state how to identify
changeable parts from an engineering perspective, namely:455
1. Identification of the [system] items that are likely to change.
2. Location of the specialized components in separate modules.
3. Design inter-module interfaces that are insensitive to the anticipated changes, preventing the changeable
aspects to be revealed by the interface.
This encapsulation approach, based on the very definition of inter-module interfaces, can be embraced460
by nano-satellite software designers to hid the changeable parts of their products and produce replaceable
modules. Besides minor modifications to correct or simplify parts of the software, nano-satellite architectures
are subject to changes in parts related to their subsystems and payloads. Changes in the subsystems do not
necessarily imply the removal of any of them; there is likely to be an Electrical Power System (EPS), an
Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS) and a Communications System. However, the actual465
hardware and their interfaces may dramatically change after a mission update. Similarly, the payloads
hosted by the spacecraft will differ from one mission to another.
In accordance to the aforementioned context, the guideline here presented proposes an encapsulation of
low-level modules based on payloads and subsystems, together with the definition of generic interfaces for
these components. The interface is defined as a set of functions that can be invoked by other modules in470
13They shall not access I/O devices nor perform any kind of non-deterministic call to external subsystem routine.
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Table 1: Low-level modules generic interface
Function Description
check() Verify that the subsystem is ready and does not present any errors. Runs unit tests on
devices, checks that there is no communication or power issue and if there are some, reports
them with details.
init() Configures internal parameters or the underlying devices in order to begin the execution of
the Running routines. Acquires static resources (e.g. memory, databases, digital buses) and
ensures that the system does not accumulate any previous error.
run() Executes the routines that control the subsystem or payload. After an invocation of this
function, the module can generate and process data, enable actuators and can communicate
with other modules.
halt() Reset all variables and devices, release resources and remove itself from the active list of
modules (e.g. exit the process).
<osf> () Interrupt the main routine or spawn a secondary execution thread to handle a custom
request. Requests may trigger sub-state transitions, perform one-time actions or request
instantaneous data.
Checked
Initialized Running
Halted
One-time 
action
Idle
Entry point
Exit
Finished
init()
check()
run()
halt()done<osf>()
done
halt()
init()
Figure 5: Low-level modules state transition network
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the architecture and which modify the internal state of the component (Figure 5). Four basic functions
are defined, namely, check(), init(), run() and halt(). Their implementations should account for the
functionality described in Table 1. This basic API, which has some resemblance with Linux drivers manage-
ment, allows the system to start and stop modules in a controlled manner. The modules could perform a
set of initial checks before any other action is performed in order to guarantee that the underlying hardware475
or subsystems are operative. When these tests succeed, the module remains in the Checked state until the
init() function is invoked. A module can, then, transition to the Running state after it has been correctly
initialized (functions init() and run()). Most self-contained modules should be able to operate the payload
or subsystem autonomously and jump to the Finished state once the Running routines are completed. Other
modules, however, may never finish because they control subsystems or devices which are always active.480
In addition, some modules may not be able to autonomously control the subsystem and may require
external triggers to transition to internal sub-states. The so-called One-Shot Functions try to account for
these triggering requirements. If the sub-states of a module were controlled by hierarchically higher com-
ponents, the designers could implement custom OSF to handle those state transitions. Moreover, modules
which are able to generate instantaneous data that is relevant to the rest of the architecture, could also485
implement specific functions to retrieve it (e.g. sensor readings, externally visible subsystem variables. . . )
Finally, either in Finalized or during Running, the function halt() can be called to cleanly terminate the
process and release the resources (e.g. memory regions, kernel services, open databases or files, peripherals,
etc.)
With this minimal, generic interface encapsulating routines that are close to the payload and subsystem490
hardware, changeable modules can be integrated seamlessly in an architecture. Provided that the interface is
kept the same, replacing low-level components should be transparent to higher-level components and should
provide the required flexibility in future nano-satellite generations.
4.3. On-board planning capabilities
Providing autonomous mission planning capabilities is, as a matter of fact, a very common approach495
towards autonomous spacecraft. Initially proposed by NASA for the DS-1 Remote Agent eXperiment [36],
and adopted in spacecraft developments since then, the concept is fundamentally based on the definition
of a set of high-level components that conform the so-called autonomy system. These modules provide the
ability to both intelligently plan and robustly execute a list of timed activities based on mission goals (either
self-generated or defined by ground operators), deterministic environmental conditions (e.g. orbit trajectory)500
and system constraints (e.g. battery state-of-charge). This design guideline proposes the functionality of
an autonomy system to be included in new nano-satellite developments and simplifies its dissemination into
the three elementary components shown in Figure 6.
On the one hand, a Task Planner module collects mission requirements in the form of abstract tasks.
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Figure 6: Autonomy System components
These tasks can be defined at the beginning of the mission, can be uploaded or modified during the satellite505
lifespan or can be autonomously generated by the autonomy system itself. High-level tasks may encompass a
priority level which allows to weight the importance of each task. Tasks uploaded by the ground segment will
tend to be prioritized over those autonomously spawned by the system. Similarly, maintenance requirements
(e.g. desaturate reaction wheels, database maintenance) will likely have lower priorities to prevent them
from interfering with instrument activities. In conjunction with the Task Planner, a minimal autonomy510
system should also encompass a robust Executive System that is able to decode the plan of action and
perform all the required procedures to achieve it. Both the Task Planner and the Executive System should
be consistent with the environmental conditions and system constraints. If an unexpected situation would
occur or a constraint would be violated, the Executive System would cancel any related routines, activate
the system safe-mode and generate a failure diagnosis report. Finally, complementing the two essential515
components a Task Generation Engine could be included. This optional module shall be capable to propose
tasks to the system: (a) either because the previous plan has been aborted; (b) due to maintenance requests;
or (c) as a result of some external observation (i.e. instrument data analysis).
Ultimately, it is worth mentioning the computational burden that an autonomy system inflicts on the
OBC. Scheduling tasks and comprehensively managing their execution is an onerous endeavor and may520
dramatically increase the usage of computational and system resources (e.g. CPU time, memory, power).
This is specially the case of deliberative task planners, where the computation required to find the optimal
schedule for a finite time window can be high. Continually correcting the plan of action with up-to-date
execution details and data analysis augments the autonomous capabilities of a spacecraft but may not be
feasible in all cases. Because of that, nano-satellite developers may be inclined to design autonomy systems525
which are deployed in its wholeness at specific periods of time, generating plans of action that are not
re-planned until the last scheduling window is completed or which are reactive instead of deliberative.
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5. Applying design criteria
Having presented three techniques which enhance the previously justified software qualities and func-
tionalities, this section describes an actual software architecture which applies these criteria and embraces530
many of the concepts presented in Section 3. This architecture is the main controlling software on-board
the CubeCAT-1 nano-satellite (3Cat-1), developed at the Nano-Satellite and Payload Laboratory (NanoSat
Lab) of the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC BarcelonaTech). The 3Cat-1 is essentially a technology
demonstration mission that integrates seven different payloads within a 1U form factor [37]. The design
of its flight software has targeted modularity and re-usability in order to become the precursor for future535
nano-satellite missions at the NanoSat Lab. Moreover, its architecture is oriented to the exploration of
autonomous operations and encompasses a task planner and robust executive system as the controlling core
for the satellite functionalities.
The 3Cat-1’s flight software architecture, depicted in Figure 7, is organized in four hierarchical layers
in accordance to the first design guideline, namely, System Core, Process Manager, System Data Bus and540
Hardware-dependent Modules. Each of these layers has been implemented as a set of isolated processes (in
some cases multi-threaded) or real-time tasks. The architecture is executed on top of a soft-real-time OS
composed of a Linux kernel and a Xenomai hypervisor. This allows for an extra level of hierarchy, given that
real-time tasks are scheduled with higher priority than regular Linux processes. As a matter of fact, the entire
Linux kernel is run during the idle states of the RTOS’ scheduler. This guarantees that critical processes545
such as those that control the system state, monitor health variables and control each of the underlying layers
never suffer from CPU starvation nor priority inversions. The Xenomai framework provides several kernel-
managed services to communicate real-time tasks with non-real-time processes. These services are used
along with standard methods (e.g. named pipes, shared memory regions, signals) to provide communication
interfaces between the components of the architecture.550
5.1. System Core
The highest level of abstraction is set at the System Core (or Syscore, for short), which is composed of five
different modules. The System Safety and State Control (SS/SC ) module is entirely designed as a real-time
component. It encompasses five Xenomai tasks which control the state of the spacecraft at the functional
and energy levels. Functional states relate to system-wide actions that are taken by the spacecraft to fulfil555
its mission goals (e.g. perform scientific experiments, enable certain functionalities such as attitude control,
establish a link with the ground segment). These functional states are coupled and induced by the energy
reservoir of the spacecraft, which is also monitored at this architectural layer. The battery state-of-charge
(SoC) is a critical variable provided by the EPS low-level module. Implementing SS/SC in the real-time
environment was a strong design requirement because this provided greater isolation between components.560
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Figure 7: 3Cat-1’s Flight Software architecture
While, teal-time tasks are managed by the real-time kernel and hypervisor, user-space Linux processes are
scheduled by the low-priority non-real-time kernel. Thus, execution of SS/SC is guaranteed, even when the
non-real-time Linux kernel is locked in unexpected states. This design choice, forced the implementation
of some EPS components to also be implemented as RT tasks, although their timing and latency are not
critical if kept within reasonable values. For the EPS task, this range of allowed latency corresponded to a565
fraction of its period of execution, which is of 60 seconds. This range was chosen together with the hardware
watchdog of the EPS microcontroller, which will cause a reset if it is locked for 16 seconds. With the EPS
component providing critical data (i.e. SoC) to the SS/SC, a failure in this software component or a delayed
sending of data causes a soft-reset of the on-board computer along with the corresponding logging activity
to notify ground operators of this event.570
Along with this real-time module, the Syscore includes part of the spacecraft’s autonomy system: a
task planner. The Task Planner is essentially a high-level system scheduler which generates a list of time-
tagged activities for a given time window. Its behaviour is purely deliberative (i.e. off-line), it executes the
scheduling algorithm for a finite period of time until a single solution is produced. The internal algorithm,
implemented in Prolog, takes task descriptions and scheduling characteristics defined at design-time and575
determines when they need to be executed, within the future scheduling window. The state of the system
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resources are predicted either by the Task Planner or by the Energy Manager. This latter component
includes models of the system that, together with the orbit propagation, allow to predict the necessary
resource profiles for the Task Planner algorithm. The number of resources controlled and allocated by the
Task Planner is limited to four, namely: energy, instantaneous power, storage capacity and operations580
simultaneity.
5.2. Process Manager
The second component of the autonomy system is a multi-threaded process named Process Manager
(or Procman). This non-real-time component implements the Executive System and decomposes high-level
commands and autonomously-generated mission plans into low-level instructions and modes of operation.585
Note that the Autonomy System of the 3Cat-1 lacks a Task Generation Engine because none of the payloads
or experiments required this functionality nor were there maintenance tasks to be scheduled autonomously.
Most of the high-level states are mapped in Procman’s finite state machines in order to set-up, monitor
and control the low-level processes of this architecture. It is also at this architectural level where the TT&C
system is implemented and all the packets are processed and generated. Thus, ground operators are capable590
to override Syscore states and have access to low-level components easily.
At the same time, power modes are managed by the Power and Power States Handler (PSH ) compo-
nents. These threads interpret energy-related commands and enable or disable spacecraft functionalities.
They also have the ability to control the power mode of the OBC, allowing them to set low-power consump-
tion modes when the energy is critical or the system is in idle states.595
Finally, the Scheduling thread, which starts by Syscore request, parses the mission plan generated by
the Task Planner and spawns a single thread to handle each of the planned activities (Task Handlers).
These handlers initialize dedicated, low-level processes and prepare the hardware to be able to start their
endeavors (e.g. enable DC/DC converters).
5.3. System Data Bus600
Although the actions performed by the Procman involve access to the spacecraft subsystems (i.e. hard-
ware), they are never performed directly by this process. Instead, the Procman can issue a set of low-level
commands. This set of commands, which are still encapsulating several instructions or procedures, can
be mission-specific in some cases (e.g. One-Shot Functions), but are usually generic in order to allow the
Procman to transparently interface with whatever low-level modules the architecture has. The interface605
with which the low-level modules and Procman are connected is the System Data Bus (SDB). This layer
acts as a command forwarder, delivering requests and replies from any module connected to it. It provides
a second level of isolation apart from protected memory regions, given that the flow of all requests are
always controlled by the SDB process. The SDB implements a simple transport protocol with timeouts
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which, despite not performing data integrity checks, does acknowledge the sender when a single command is610
executed/read by the receiver. At the same time, the SDB protocol defines restricted commands which are
only available to some modules (e.g. low-level modules can not request DC/DC converters to be enabled
because this action is strictly solely restricted for the Procman; however, all modules can request sensor
measurements.)
5.4. Hardware-dependent Modules615
The lower-level functionality is located in the Hardware-dependent Modules layer. This part of the
software is composed of specialized modules (or HWmod ’s) that can be analogous to device drivers. All
HWmod ’s implement the previously mentioned generic interface (check(), init(), run() and halt()) and,
in some cases, custom OSF. HWmod ’s execute device-level instructions like R/W operations and digital pin
control, and implement communication protocols for each of the external devices connected through digital620
buses (e.g. UART, I2C, SPI). They are, indeed, subsystem and payloads controllers and because of that,
there is a single HWmod for each payload or subsystem. While the details for each of the payloads and
subsystems can be read in [37, 38], it is important to note that these software components are not always
running. With the exception of EPS, which is constantly monitoring battery SoC and PV panel’s power,
the rest of the HWmod ’s are launched by demand when some of the payload or subsystem activities have625
to be performed.
5.5. Interfaces, files and databases
A critical aspect of this hierarchical design is to be able to preclude error propagation from one module
to the other. Despite the fact that all modules run with virtually-separated memory areas, there still
are inter-process or inter-task communication methods. Most of the communication channels employed630
in this architecture are named-pipes (i.e. FIFO’s) where the process always involves a timeout. If a given
subsystem fails, bottom-up error propagation is precluded by catching the error in the upper layer (including,
for instance, timeouts) and by restarting whatever procedure or component presented the failure.
1 HW_TIMEOUT =1000000 # Microseconds635
2 TIMEOUT_HANDSHAKE =2
3 TIMEOUT_SDS =5
4 TIMEOUT_EDS =5
5 TIMEOUT_ACK =7
6 ADAPTIVE_MODIFIER =1.0640
7 HS_REPEAT =6
8 HSACK_REPEAT =10
9 ACK_REPEAT =5
10 LAST_REPEAT =3
11 SYNC_REPEAT =2645
24
12 PROTOCOL_DELAY =1000 # Microseconds
13 SYNC_DELAY =100000 # Microseconds
14 FREQ2_RX =10 # Uplink freq.
15 FREQ1_RX =9D
16 FREQ0_RX =89650
17 FREQ2_TX =10 # Downlink freq.
18 FREQ1_TX=D1
19 FREQ0_TX =3B
20 DRATE=F8 # Data -rate
21 SYNC1=D2655
22 SYNC0 =59
23 ADDR =00
24 FEC_DIS =0 # FEC enabled
Listing 1: Comms. HWmod configuration file
On the other hand, data generated by the system can also be stored in the file system, either as a regular660
file or in SQLite databases. The architecture encompasses up to four different databases where processes
can register new files and change their state, update the state of a task and read or write system logs and
housekeeping measurements (e.g. voltage, temperature, attitude states, etc.) In addition, most components
of the architecture can be dynamically configured through configuration files stored in the file system. These
files, which usually have a list of values for several configuration parameters, may allow ground operators to665
adjust the behavior of the system in-orbit (e.g. changing PID controller constants, changing the downlink
frequency, etc.) Listing 1 above, shows an example of the contents of one of such configuration files.
5.6. Development assets
Finally, it is worth noting that for updatability purposes, and thanks to the adoption of a Linux OS,
most of the architectural features are provided through dynamically-linked libraries. These system libraries,670
which are loaded at runtime, implement the SDB protocol and interfaces for HWmod ’s, provide several
wrappers to access and write to the databases, and decouple some TT&C procedures and functions from
the Procman process (therefore allowing in-orbit upgrades of the telemetry system).
6. Conclusion
Regardless of the size of the spacecraft, the extremely harsh conditions of space can lead to a myriad675
of system failures. Apart from the effects of ionized particles, which not only can induce catastrophic
software misbehavior but can also cause severe power failures, thermal cycles and extreme temperatures may
deteriorate batteries and other components. This is specially true for missions that integrate several COTS
modules, which hardly include any rad-hard or space-qualified component. Despite their reduced cost (and
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risk), nano-satellite missions still demand significant efforts in order to improve their robustness. At the same680
time, one common idea within the small spacecraft paradigm is the development of reusable platforms that
can accommodate to several mission functional requirements. This approach, often crystallized into payload-
agnostic commercial products (e.g. Endeavor Platform14, by Tyvak Inc.), has expanded the capacity limits
of CubeSat missions and has fostered the exploration of modular and flexible architectures. Noteworthy, low-
cost and highly-modular designs have also turned nano-satellites into suitable platforms to deploy complex685
satellite systems such as large constellations involving thousands of units. In alignment with this idea,
nano-satellites contributing to a cooperative mission potentially require their autonomous capabilities to be
enhanced, not only to enable such distributed architectures but specially to ameliorate their recoverability
and cope with their restricted operability.
The work described in this paper has introduced these three essential requirements, namely: (a) robust-690
ness; (b) payload-oriented modularity and (c) autonomy, and has mapped them to three software design
guidelines: (a) robustness through hierarchical decomposition of system functionalities; (b) payload-oriented
modularity; and (c) on-board planning capabilities. The presented guidelines showed ways to improve these
system qualities and functionalities from the software perspective and at an architectural level. In that sense,
the first two guidelines proposed a way to structure and design software modules which is fundamentally695
based on isolation of components and minimization of internal complexity, and encapsulation of mission-
dependent subsystems with a general purpose interface. Software architectures that apply those concepts
can easily replace, include or remove payload functionality and may present an improved robustness if prop-
agation of low-level errors (i.e. those related with hardware and devices external to the on-board computer)
is prevented or reliably handled. On the other hand, such hierarchical ordering of components allows system700
critical modules to be implemented in higher levels of the architecture and detached from hardware. Finally,
this paper has proposed the design of a primitive autonomy system which is aimed at providing on-board
planning capabilities to the nano-satellite. The generic autonomy system, elaborated from previous mission
concepts (e.g. RAX, EO-1), is described as a set of components with a delimited goal.
The derived design criteria has been ultimately illustrated in an actual software architecture for a nano-705
satellite mission, the 3Cat-1. Its software architecture has applied hierarchical ordering of components and
payload-oriented modularization and presents a secure and reliable message-passing interface that transpar-
ently connects low-level modules with the autonomy system of the spacecraft. Moreover, the flight software
is equipped with an autonomy system consisting of a multi-threaded flight executive and a fully-elastic task
planner that is able to allocate more than one system resource to each activity while generating a plan of710
action for the spacecraft.
14http://www.tyvak.com/platform
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